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The first attempt to set up a planning unit in
Egypt took place a few months after the military
junta had seized power. In October 1952, the
Permanent Council for the Development of Na-
tional Production (or Permanent Production Coun-
cil) was formed as an independent agency of the
Cabinet, with the following functions :
1. To examine and recommend projects of
development in the fields of irrigation, land re-
clamation, electrification, mining, and industrializa-
tion and to examine the means of financing these
projects, both internally and externally;
2. To present to the Cabinet, within a year of
its inception, an integrated program of national
economic development to be carried out over three
years; and pending the completion of the plan,
to present, as deemed necessary, well conceived
projects for immediate execution; and
3. To proceed with an early examination of the
possibilities of increasing the local supply of food
grains, petroleum, sugar, animal products, and
fertilizers, with a view to overcoming existing
bottlenecks.
The Council, presided over by the Prime
Minister, could carry out certain schemes and
launch pilot-plants, to be administered directly
under its own supervision, or under supervision
delegated to others. It was also required to follow
up the execution of approved schemes.
Failing to perceive development as an integrated
and coordinated activity demanding more than a
random performance, however, the Council became
concerned mainly with single projects or, at best,
with groups of projects. &dquo; Its look &dquo;, says Dr. Ibra-
him Abdel-Rahman, Director General of the Insti-
tute of National Planning, 
&dquo; 
was nearer to that of
a private business agency endowed with public
authority (1) &dquo;.
~~-
Then, shortly after its establishment, the Council
was dispersed, and until 1955, the Egyptian
Government experimented with various planning
organizations, such as the Higher Organization for
Coordination and Planning (1952-1954), an advi-
sory committee with no authority to make decisions
binding upon the individual ministers, and the
Permanent Council of Public Services (1953-
1955) (2).
These planning units were perhaps symptomatic
of the political instability and power struggle
characteristic of the early years of the military
regime in Egypt. Administratively, the units were
based on two principles : (a) Sectoral planning,
and (b) Unity between planning and execution.
Due to Egypt’s limited resources and high rate
of population growth, and, above all, due to Egypt’s
desire to build the High Dam of Aswan (which
became identified with the political, economic, and
social aspirations of the regime), it was decided,
for the first time, to set up a comprehensive plan-
ning agency. Therefore, in March 1955, the
National Planning Committee was established.
National Planning Committee
The Committee was born during a period of
grave crisis in Egyptian history, emanating from
the failure to materialize the loan from the United
States for the building of the Dam, from the
nationalization of the Suez Canal, and from the
hostilities that followed. For two years, the
country’s leadership was almost exclusively con-
cerned with foreign policy and defense, and there
was little accomplished in the vital area of economic
development. It was only in January 1958, with
the final stabilization of the regime under the
uncontested leadership of President Nasser, that
(1) Planning for Balanced Social and Economic Dev-
elopment, Cairo, Institute of National Planning, memo
No. 63, 1961, p. 15.
(2) Each ministry was instructed to form a planning
committee composed of the senior staff members of the
ministry, while individual ministers remained free to
carry the proposals of their own planning committee
directly to the Council of Ministers.
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planning was acted upon rather seriously, and the
final foundations of permanent planning apparatus
were laid. It is the critical analysis of this ap-
paratus that concerns us most.
The new planning organization was composed of
a Higher Council, under the chairmanship of the
President of the Republic, and a National Planning
Committee (NPC), under the chairmanship of the
Minister of National Planning.
The entire body of ministers and deputy
ministers forms the Higher Council which defines
the general objectives of the development program
and examines the draft plans prepared by the NPC.
In preparing the draft comprehensive plan the
NPC defines in particular:
1. Financial resources.
2. Allocation of material resources to different uses.
3. Methods of finance and credit in the public and
private sectors.
4. Foreign exchange situation and balance of
payment.
5. Projects and programs of investment in all of
the economic and social sectors.
6. Vocational and technical training and human
resources.
7. Procedures and agencies of the coordination of
execution and development.
8. Follow-up of the plan.
9. Statistical activities in the country (3).
The principle of separation between planning
and execution is maintained. Not only has the
central planning staff no executive responsibility,
but the whole area of execution is decentralized -
functionally and territorially. On the functional
level, ministries, departments, and public enter-
prises are responsible, each in its field of work,
for executing the projects and realizing the targets
of the Five-Year Plan. Territorially, the country
is divided into 25 Governorates (mohafazat) each
headed by a Governor with the rank of deputy
minister. Each one of the functional and terri-
torial units has a planning committee which
initiates specific projects to be examined later by
the NPC in accordance with the national plan (4).
In other words, these local bodies do not, in fact,
enjoy much authority. They are mere transmission
belts carrying orders from central planning
authorities and feeding up some technical details.
Even the director of the Institute of National
Planning could not delineate their activities more
precisely than to say they rest &dquo; in the fields of
social and infrastructural services ( 5 ) &dquo;. Unoffi-
cially, as one informant pointed out to this author,
these local bodies attempt to 
&dquo; popularize &dquo;
planning, that is, to bring the objectives of the
plan closer to the people.
The Operation of the Planning Unit
In spite of the organizational paraphernalia we
have just described, authority still remains in the
hands of the President of the Republic. As Abdel-
Rahman pointed out:
Preliminary directions as well as the final adoption
of the plan are in the hands of the President himself,
assisted by a ministerial committee for planning (6).
It is commonly agreed that chairmanship of the
planning unit by the chief executive of any country
imparts a great measure of authority and prestige
to the actions of the unit, and assures the fastest
possible response from other agencies. This is
particularly true in Egypt where the chief executive,
President Nasser, enjoys supreme authority over his
countrymen. But while authoritative leadership
in a country such as Egypt is a boon, it becomes
as well a bogie, for precisely because of this kind
of leadership, criticism cannot be voiced and short-
comings are concealed. Against this background,
the work done by Professors Gulick and Pollock
of the United States becomes especially valuable,
as it illuminates some aspects of the planning
machinery hitherto curtailed from all outside the
small ruling elite in Egypt (7).
The criticism by Gulick and Pollock is most
severe. For example, they say that &dquo; the U.A.R.
now has a first-rate plan and planning system on
paper &dquo; (8), and then they cite the folowing
&dquo; 
points of serious failure &dquo;, in the present organ-
ization and procedures of NPC :
... up till now the National Plan is insufficiently an
organic part of government or administration. Until
very recently, planning has been a superficially added
activity of government, much as the automobile starter
was first introduced as a special gadget, or 
&dquo; extra &dquo;...
... planning is now too exclusively a central-govern-
(3) Abdel-Rahman, Op. cit., pp. 34-35.
(4) Ibrahim Abdel-Rahman and M. Tewfiq Ramzi,
The Organizational and Administrative Aspects of
Development Planning, Cairo, Institute of National
Planning, 1961, p. 17.
(5) Ibrahim Abdel-Rahman, Organization Arrange-
ments for National Planning in the UAR, presented at
a UN Conference on the Application of Science and
Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas,
E/Conf. 39/H/53, 19 October 1962, p. 7.
(6) Ibid., p. 7.
(7) Luther Gulick and James K. Pollock, Govern-
ment Re-organization in the United Arab Republic (A
Report Submitted to the Central Committee for the
Re-organization of the Machinery of Government),
Cairo, 1962. My thanks go to Professor Pollock for
making the report available to me.
(8) Ibid., p. 31.
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ment, ivory tower operation.... the execution of the
Plan must not rely solely on central direction and
supervision; it must draw in those who do the work,
in office, plant, shop and local government.
Only a few officials and intellectuals now know
what the Plan is or pay any attention to its provision.
There is as yet no adequate system for translating
Plan decisions into accountable orders issued to
operating agencies (9).
The major reason for the unsatisfactory status
of the planning effort, according to the authors,
... arises not from the planning machinery itself,
but from the administration habits of the total govern-
ment, and from the lack of administrative force and
orderliness which characterises governmental manage-
ment as such.
The authors further point out that
The present habits of management are not geared
to planning. The men who run the agencies, and
their top civil servants, never lived in a world of
comprehensive social and economic planning before.
The whole psychology of the thing is new to them.
Such planning was never part of their work habits.
Even the best men have been working to get their
own job done well, they have never had time to think
of whether they fit into a carefully designed compre-
hensive and coordinating national economic and social
effort (10).
The authors also observed that:
There appears to be an excessive system of controls
which inhibits the exercise of prompt and effective
action (11).
Prior to the submitting of Gulick and Pollock’s
report, and in order to overcome these and other
obstacles, sixty joint committees were formed of
senior officers of the NPC and executives from
ministries and public agencies. A further remedial
step was the establishment, early in 1959, of a
planning office in every ministry and public
agency, to be attached to the office of the minister
or the head of the agency. &dquo; The members of
each office &dquo;, a former staff member of the
planning organization states
[were] chosen and appointed by the Minister or
the Agency Head.... there was no sound basis
for the appointment of these members as Planning
Office members. Most of them lacked the necessary
knowledge and skill to perform their duties. One
year later, it was found that the formal link between
the Planning offices and the National Planning staff
was not clear, and, to many authorities, it proved
unworkable (12).
SUMMARY
As we sum up our brief discussion of the
Egyptian planning machinery, we are forced to
conclude that the machinery has not performed
satisfactorily in spite of the strong political sup-
port given to it by the top political leadership of
the country. A partial answer may be provided in
the fact that the departmental coordination and
cooperation so necessary to carrying out the pro-
vision of the plan seem to be ineffective. There
appears to be a failure to weave national planning
machinery into the fabric of government. As a
result, the &dquo; Top Command &dquo; make the decisions
and issue the commands &dquo; but somewhere the battle
is lost. That which was decided fails to happen.
Instead of a single national plan, each agency still
tends to go off on its own, with a different set of
private objectives (13) &dquo;. Although the ruling
group and most of the civil servants in policy-
making positions seem to be committed to the
objectives of development planning, such conscien-
tiousness has not penetrated sufficiently into the
middle and lower ranks of the service where lies
the responsibility for the detailed execution of
the plan.
(9) Ibid., pp. 30-31.
(10) Ibid., p. 32.
(11) Ibid., p. 8.
(12) Salah A. Gohar, The Administrative Organiz-
ation of Developing Planning, MPA thesis, The Univer-
sity of Michigan, Institute of Public Administration,
Ann Arbor, 1962, p. 8.
(13) Gulick and Pollock, Op. cit., pp. 6-7.
